This working paper maps out the structure and value chains of the wind industry, analyzes the wind industry's increasing global integration via cross-border trade and investment flows, and offers recommendations to policymakers for the design of investment and trade policies to help realize wind energy's potential. We find that demand for wind energy through longterm government support policies creates the basis for local supply of wind capital equipment and services and associated local job creation; policies that put a price on carbon will further help to make wind energy more competitive and increase the overall demand for turbines and equipment. Cross-border investment rather than trade is the dominant mode of the wind industry's global integration. Principal barriers to global integration are nontariff trade barriers and formal and informal barriers that distort firms' investment decisions. These include local content requirements, divergent national industrial standards and licensing demands, and in particular political expectations. Intellectual property accounts for only a very small part of cost in the wind industry, and wind technology is widely available for licensing. Intellectual property rights are correspondingly not a major impediment for market participation. Credible long-term commitments coupled with a reduction or elimination of existing barriers to cross-border trade and investment are necessary to harness the full potential of global integration in reducing wind industry prices and increase worldwide deployment of wind energy. JEL Codes: H23, L22, Q42, Q48, Q56
IntroductIon
The political debate concerning climate change and global trade and investment flows has increasingly taken on a defensive posture in the United States and other developed countries. The spotlight has been on the competitiveness of energy-intensive industries and potential border adjustment mechanisms to prevent carbon leakage, as well as on the need to grow and protect industries that will gain from a low-carbon future and create millions of new "green jobs" at home.
This paper analyzes the global wind power industry in light of the latter debate and shows that global integration-broadly defined as increasing cross-border trade and investment flows 2 -can make a strong positive contribution in the form of green technology cost reductions and innovation while still creating predominantly local jobs. As such, national trade and investment policies that promote increased global integration of the wind industry are a powerful ally in the fight against climate change.
Our analysis starts with a brief summary of current and future global demand for wind turbines and the role of government support in this demand picture. Next, we show how the wind energy sector is developing into a truly global industry characterized by high levels of growth and competition and how this process is increasingly driven by cross-border investment rather than trade. Then we map out the globalization potential of different components in the value chain and analyze existing barriers to further global integration. Finally, we discuss the distributional consequences of greater globalization and especially the outlook for green job creation along the wind value chain, before we conclude with a set of policy recommendations.
Our principal findings are:
. Local demand creation draws in local production. Demand for wind energy through long-term government support policies creates the basis for local supply of wind capital equipment and services and associated local job creation; policies that put a price on carbon will further help to make wind more competitive and increase the overall demand for turbines and equipment.
2. Cross-border investment rather than trade is the dominant mode of global integration. Standard international trade in wind energy equipment is relatively small and declining. Instead, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows dominate the global integration of the wind sector, and the cost structure of the wind industry favors the emergence of regional production hubs in markets of sufficient size.
expected to shift increasingly to the offshore segment. Longer-term projections for the wind turbine market also remain bullish, based on clear political commitments in the main markets to continue the expansion of the sector (table 2) .
The 2009-3 projections in table 2 indicate that actual wind power market growth is on track (again) to surpass the growth targets included in US, EU, and Chinese official scenarios for rapid wind sector expansion in the coming years.
Government Support as main driver of demand
The global demand for wind turbines is principally driven not by the cost competitiveness of wind power but by revenue-side considerations, in particular the availability of government support measures for renewable energy sources. The global picture of wind turbine installations shows that demand closely follows the availability of subsidies and other government incentives and to a lesser extent other variables like the quality of wind speed or the availability of appropriate infrastructure. 2 Such support measures come in several categories and are implemented at all levels of government. They can be in the form of direct financial support to or requirements for renewable energy production/investments. Or they can be supporting renewable energy indirectly, for instance, by putting a price on carbon emissions across energy sources. The most frequently used types are described in box .
Governments have varied preferences with respect to individual support measures, 3 but most policymakers have at some point come to accept the necessity of providing financial support to promote the demand for wind energy. In many countries, particularly in Europe, the most widely used policy tools have been renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and feed-in tariffs (FITs). While a heated debate continues as to which of these approaches is preferable, 4 they have one important point in common:
The government creates a legal framework but does not directly provide a subsidy. Instead, utilities pass through the additional costs of renewable power and spread it out across all power consumers.
box 1 Government policies to support renewable energy sources 1 direct renewable financial Support measures n investment incentives, usually in the form of direct subsidies, soft loans and tax credits;
n generation incentives, either directly provided by the government, usually in the form of tax credits or mandated by the government through legislation requiring utilities and grid operators to accept renewable power into their grid and pay a fixed price for it. Such legislation provides certainty to generators of renewable/wind power that they will receive a fixed feed-in tariff (FIT) or a fixed premium above the market price for electricity. Directly paying for the FIT through all consumers' power bills has the advantage that such a program does not require direct government budget appropriations. Gradually reducing FITs after a given date can further serve to maintain the incentives of wind turbine producers to reduce power production costs for newly installed turbines.
direct renewable market penetration requirements
n tradable certificate systems (also known as renewable portfolio standards [RPS] ), in which different participants of the power supply chain (generators, utilities, grid operators, or retailers) are obliged to supply/purchase a given percentage of electricity from eligible renewable sources;
n tendering/bidding systems: calls for tender are launched for specified amounts of renewable energy/ production capacity with contract winners receiving a guaranteed price for a specified period of time.
Indirect renewable Support measures
n introduction of environmental (including CO ) taxes on power produced from non-renewable sources;
n compulsory cap and trade systems for CO emitters covering the power-generating sectors, with the strongest and most efficient incentives created in systems with full auctioning of permits.
broader renewable energy enabling measures
n regulatory promotion, for instance, facilitated site planning and noise and visual impairment requirements that strike the right balance between addressing public concerns and eliminating unnecessary regulatory obstacles;
n public investments in smart grid technology to enable large-scale power supply from variable production rate renewable power source.
. For an elaboration, see Morthorst et al. (009) .
. Certificates can usually be obtained either by producing or purchasing the required renewable power itself or by purchasing only the renewable energy certificates independently of the underlying power.
. This would, for instance, include the smart grid investment spending announced by the Obama administration on October 7, 009, available at www.whitehouse.gov.
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Direct financial support by the government has also been used, particularly in the United States, which first introduced a federal production tax credit (PTC) 5 with the 992 Energy Policy Act, and the impact of direct financial support on new investment levels has since been critical, as 
coSt trendS And competItIveneSS of WInd poWer
The wind energy sector has historically seen steep industry learning curves and corresponding declining average project costs. During the early years of the (onshore) wind industry in the 980s and 990s, industry productivity rose rapidly 7 and average project costs for installed capacity declined from ). This change was driven partly by supply constraints and partly by rapidly rising commodity prices. The recent cost increase in the wind industry mirrored the surge in capital costs across different power generation technologies during this period. 9 The fact that other sources of energy 5 . The United States typically relies on tax credits as an instrument of government financial support, while, for instance, European countries usually rely on direct financial transfers from the government. Assuming recipients pay some taxes, the financial impact of a production tax credit (PTC) and a guaranteed FIT from the government is similar. The early growth of US wind power in California in the 980s was also based upon state and federal investment tax credits and government guaranteed prices for wind-power. See DoE (2009).
6. See IEA database (see footnote 3) and BTM Consult (2008a Consult ( , 2009 ).
7. Wind industry so-called learning rates were as high as 4 to 5 percent annually. The learning rate (and its inverse the progress ratio) is a standard tool for understanding long-term cost trends and relates cumulative installation/production and associated costs. For every doubling of cumulative installed capacity/production, the learning rate indicates the associated reduction in costs. See Arrow (962) , Boston Consulting Group (972), and Abell and Hammond (979 
future competitiveness of Wind power
Governments' targeted direct financial support and explicit policy promotion of wind power (and other renewable energy sources) are, when offered on a stable and sustained long-term basis, likely to continue to play an important role for future wind industry growth. However, wind energy is likely to benefit increasingly from indirect policy measures, too, and begin to compete on an increasingly commercial basis with other sources of power supply.
Comparative estimates suggest that the most cost efficient wind power-onshore production in coastal (i.e., good wind) areas-becomes competitive with traditionally generated power even at moderate fossil fuel prices once environmental, security of supply, and other usually nonmonetized externalities are accounted for. 20 Imposing a price on carbon emissions is one important way of internalizing some of these externalities. The increasing use of policies imposing a price on carbon emissions will therefore be a major additional growth driver for wind energy in the future. Similarly, the establishment of official renewable energy targets in the United States, European Union, China, and other countries 2 and the resulting expansion of FITs or RPS rules in power supply will continue to offer strong demand support for wind energy. A wind industry relying increasingly on demand support from, for instance, economy-wide and relatively stable carbon pricing would face far less political risk to its demand side (i.e., the risk that direct government financial support be suddenly withdrawn) and hence present potential investors with a more stable long-term investment outlook. This stabilizing effect would likely provide a powerful independent boost to the demand for wind energy and allow manufacturers to further expand economies of scale.
In the future, the cost competitiveness of the wind sector when compared with other sources of energy supply will therefore become more important for the growth of the industry. An analysis of the current cost structure of wind investments provides insights into the determinants of the future power cannot yet be economically stored and wind energy is a variable producer, introducing large shares of wind power into an electricity system increases total infrastructure costs of securing constant grid balancing.
On balance, industry analysts agree that with continued global integration of wind power manufacturing and related continued steep wind industry learning curves, future capital cost declines will dominate construction, O&M, and grid connectivity cost trends, and the long-term decline in total wind industry investment costs seen until around 2004 will resume. Maintaining strong policy support for carbon pricing, other renewable energy support measures, and trade and investment policies that promote global industry integration will be crucial for this scenario to unfold.
Structure And GlobAl InteGrAtIon of the WInd InduStry
Global integration is a powerful force that can be harnessed to reduce the cost of wind technologies by increasing economies of scale, fostering competition, and encouraging innovation. The wind energy industry is in the midst of a process toward deeper global integration, with multinational company investment flows (FDI) gradually replacing standard cross-border trade as dominant vehicle of globalization. Regional markets and production hubs are emerging, and a growing number of wind turbine producers from developing countries participate in the market as global suppliers.
Industry Structure
As table 4 demonstrates, wind turbine investments can essentially be broken down into two main categories: capital equipment (i.e., turbines) and everything else. Similarly, two distinct, but overlapping, "value chains" exist in the wind industry: the wind turbine production value chain and the wind power production value chain ( The company has both invested in new production facilities abroad ("greenfield investments") and acquired a series of foreign competitors (cross-border M&A transactions). 30 The principal encouraging point for the developing world, however, is that developing countries tend to follow the same broad pattern as developed countries with respect to wind market participants. Create a sufficiently large domestic market (as in China and India), and domestic wind turbine suppliers emerge. As in the early Californian and European pioneers, in the developing world, too, today it is local demand creation that matters most.
Leading wind turbine producers do not independently produce every part of their turbines but rely on an extensive network of external suppliers for a big share of the up to 8,000 individual components that a standard utility-scale wind turbine consists of. 3 As such, the industry's sourcing strategies and supply chains, summarized in table 5, are of critical importance. Some segments of the industry supply chain, like blades and gearboxes, are characterized by large degrees of vertical integration and direct control and ownership of the turbine manufacturer, while for other segments, such as towers and bearings, turbine producers rely overwhelmingly on external producers (table 5) .
Interviewed industry experts identified a common need among globally leading firms to ensure the quality of their components and two different supply chain strategies being used to achieve this:
Some firms have moved towards increased vertical integration, producing their own components, which guarantees supply and enhances quality control over key components. Others have increasingly relied on the rapidly improving supply capacity from smaller external suppliers, especially in the emerging nonEuropean production hubs in the United States and China. In the latter case, the leading wind turbine producers demand that local external suppliers produce according to world industry standards.
The wind power production value chain (captured at the bottom "downstream" part of table 5) consists of the planning, construction, and operation of grid connected wind parks. Unlike the manufacturing supply chain of turbine production, wind power production consists mainly of related services, such as assessment of suitable wind park sites, wind investment financing, logistics, construction services, and the subsequent O&M services and power sales.
The direct involvement of leading turbine producers in the wind power production supply chain varies from project to project. Some transactions are on an "everything included basis," such that the turbine producer will also be responsible for the planning, deployment, and subsequent O&M servicing.
However, as the wind power industry customer base has increasingly become large established utilities, the wind power production supply chain is gradually being taken over by these utilities, which often possess the required in-house capacity for managing the complete process. The 5 largest global utilities, dominated by European, US, and Chinese players, in 2008 owned approximately 36 percent of all installed wind production capacity. 32 With the European shift toward offshore wind power and the associated increase in financing requirements, as well as the growing use of portfolio requirements for utilities in some parts of the world, this trend can be expected to accelerate.
current State of Global Integration in the Wind Industry
Most debates surrounding globalization focus on the most visible mode, namely trade in goods and services. The same is true for the different initiatives to harness globalization for making green technology cheaper, better, and more widely available: They almost exclusively focus on cross-border trade flows and related tariff and nontariff barriers. 33 However, the analysis of the global wind industry shows that trade has become relatively less important in the wind industry and firms have mainly used cross-border investment as a mode for global integration of their value chains.
An analysis of traditional cross-border world trade in wind turbines and related components is complicated due to various technical obstacles. 34 Table 6 presents the most recent (2008) 35. Table 6 includes only HS 6-digit category 8502.3and not categories for individual components, due to the issues described in the previous footnote. The data in table 6 are therefore an underestimate of total trade in wind turbines and related components. A more detailed 0-digit data selection from USITC (2009) The rapid increase in wind industry FDI is illustrated in figure 2 , which breaks down greenfield investments in wind turbine related production from 0 recorded projects by destination country. 4 Included are investments from nine of the top 5 companies included in figure , which created an estimated over 20,000 jobs over the period. 42 Wind turbine investment flows into or within the European 4. The fDiIntelligence database includes only "greenfield investments" and not M&A transactions. Furthermore, only investments where a direct link to wind turbine production could be identified are included. This will mean that some investments in wind turbine supply industries are excluded. As such, the data in figure 2 are likely an underestimate of true investment flows in the wind industry. For comparative reasons with EU aggregates included, data in figure 2 include domestic investments across state and provincial lines.
42. This number includes both announced project job creation and estimates by fDiIntelligence for projects where no job creation numbers were available. 44. At the same time, it should be emphasized that several of the major suppliers, such as SKF, ABB, and Bosch-Rexrodt, to turbine producers are major multinational companies in their own right, who have their own global production strategies independent of turbine producers. to price and quality competitiveness or other commercial calculations but to industrial policy objectives or political quid-pro-quo expectations (box 2). Yet, this investment is also part of a broader non-wind industry financial diversification trend in capital inflows from China, and as long as such projects do not become the dominant form of wind power investment, they should not be misread as an indicator of a switch away from the predominantly local supply chain organization for the entire industry.
The finding that relatively large national markets for wind turbines tend to see either the emergence of dominant domestic wind turbine producers (as in earlier years in Denmark, Germany, Spain, United
States, India, and now China) or the inflow of wind turbine producer FDI 50 is consistent with several strands of the theoretical FDI literature. The "proximity-concentration hypothesis" from Brainard (993) and Markusen and Venables (2000) suggest that FDI is positively correlated with high transportation costs, as found in the wind industry. Similarly, as posited by Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) , in a world of heterogeneous firms, FDI will increasingly dominate export sales in sectors where fixed establishment costs decline and variable trading costs remain high.
future of Globalized Wind Industry value chains
We just illustrated the gradual consolidation of the wind industry into regional production hubs with increased levels of local content in the United States and increasingly China and continued self- Ltd. 2009a, 2) . The Chinese wind turbine producer A-Power Energy Generation Systems in Shenyang is supplying 240 2.5MW turbines to west Texas between March 200 and March 20. The $.5 billion project costs will be financed by Chinese state-owned banks via the intermediation of SPG (A-Power Energy Generation Systems Ltd. 2009b, 5) . The project is the first time Chinese-manufactured wind turbines are to be imported to the United States, while up until recently the majority of wind turbines installed in the United States were imported from Europe. At first sight this project seems to run counter to the wind industry trends described in this paper.
However, the project costs of $.5 billion, or $2,500/KW, is actually significantly above the Department of Energy (DoE 2009, figure 22 ) estimates of Texas' average for capacity weighted installed project costs of roughly $,800/KW for 2007-08 and even above the highest individual project cost in the sample (of 20 projects accounting for 2,799MW) of about $2,200/KW. As such, using Chinese-manufactured wind turbines seems significantly more expensive than the average for Texas wind projects, where in 2009 prices can be expected to have even come down somewhat since 2007-08 following the US wind energy slowdown in 2009. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that this is an outlier and not a project based solely on commercial considerations and that the Shenyang government possibly has insisted on the turbines being produced in Shenyang as a quid-proquo for its involvement.
There are also more noteworthy aspects of this project. The Chinese manufacturer A-Power licensed on commercial terms the 2.5MW wind turbine technology involved from the German turbine producer Fuhrländer for a transfer fee of approximately $6.4 million and a minimum of approximately $8. million in training fees and a royalty payment over the first six years of the agreement (A-Power Energy Generation Systems Ltd. 2009c). As such, the project indicates both the large recent progress made by the Chinese wind turbine industry and its current limitations.
Additional Chinese-financed investments in Chinese-made wind turbines into the US market similar to the Texas project cannot be ruled out in the immediate future. However, the abnormal particulars of the Texas projects does not suggest that in the long term Chinese wind turbine producers will globalize their operations in foreign markets in a manner different than earlier European wind turbine producers. As such, the most likely long-term market supply strategy for Chinese wind turbine producers for the US market remains future foreign direct investment (FDI). Indeed, a subsequent announcement by A-Power and US-REG (A-Power Energy Generation Systems Ltd. 2009d) attests to this view, as the joint venture announced their intention to develop a manufacturing and assembly facility in the United States to assemble wind turbine generator set components.
In addition, though, the Texas project created a political outcry in the United States. On November 5, New York Senator Charles Schumer wrote to US Energy Secretary Steven Chu to request that the project be denied financial support from the Obama administration's 2009 American Recovery and Reconstruction Act (ARRA) funds 2 on the grounds that jobs were created from stimulus funds in China rather than the United States. This highlights a lasting tension between the long-term policy aims for promoting US renewable energy and the short-term imperatives of stimulating US job creation.
3
. See US-REG press release at www.us-reg.com/news.
See Charles
Schumer press release, November 5, 2009 at http://schumer.senate.gov.
3. Schumer's announcement further ignores the issue that the only "long-term"-i.e., lasting for the operational life of the wind turbines-jobs created from any single wind project is in operation and maintenance (O&M) services. All these jobs in the Texas project will be located in the United States, while only the "temporary" manufacturing jobs from the one-off production of the 240 wind turbines will be in China. Lasting manufacturing jobs in the wind turbine industry are generated only through sustained expansion of installed wind turbine capacity through many individual wind farm projects.
(box continues next page)
to low-wage destinations, especially China and India. However, given the cost composition of major turbine components, such a scenario seems unlikely. The most likely future for the industry is continued market-seeking, FDI-driven global integration, and possibly the emergence of new domestic producers in sufficiently large markets. Trade flows will likely remain a complement, allowing firms to flexibly source certain low-trading cost parts.
Raw material costs are by far the most important component in all principal wind turbine components, ranging between 60 to 90 percent of total costs (table 7) . With raw materials accounting for the lion's share of total turbine costs, rapid turbine cost inflation during the recent run-up in world commodity prices was unavoidable. Labor on the other hand accounts for a rather modest share of total turbine costs: Aside from the final assembly process of the full nacelle (i.e., of gearbox, generators, bearings, and other main components inside the nacelle), which is relatively labor intensive, only blade production entails significant labor costs. Intellectual property included in table 7 in the residual "other costs" category accounts for perhaps 2 percent of total turbine costs, with intellectual property in gearboxes, bearings, and blades accounting for the bulk hereof. 5 This combination of low labor input, high transportation costs and uniform world commodity prices makes it difficult for turbine producers to achieve large cost reductions by shifting turbine 5 . This estimate is based on our interviews with industry experts and an analysis of various technology licensing agreements.
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Box 2 A Texas wind farm, Chinese turbines, and a New York senator (continued)
The issue that Schumer raised is that the project-as any current US wind farm project-will benefit from US financial support provisions for wind (and other renewable energy sources) included in the ARRA stimulus package. The ARRA stimulus bill included among its provisions renewed funding for the 2009-12 period for the existing production tax credit (PTC), as well as other incentives for US wind power. 4 Hereby, pre-existing policy support measures for wind energy suddenly became funded through a "legislative vehicle" in the US Congress that saddles them with even more explicit requirements for quid-pro-quo local job creation than usual. This shows the danger of trying to achieve two policy objectives-increased investments in wind power and immediate local job creation-with the same policy tool, the PTC. 5 Such calls for "Buy American" in a stimulus package aimed at generating US jobs, but which also funds support measures for wind (and other renewable energy sources), exemplifies how explicit political quid-pro-quo expectations for local job creation are always on the agenda in any industry that-like wind power-benefits from direct taxpayer financed support. 4 . See the AWEA website at www.awea.org for a detailed description of wind stimulus measures included in the ARRA. production to low-cost locations. Barring unexpected radical new innovations in wind turbine design or other factors distorting the global cost picture, 52 industry investment location decisions can therefore be expected to remain predominantly market-seeking (i.e., investments in turbine production facilities go to the countries where demand for turbines exist) and regionally dispersed. The reemergence of globally dominant centers of wind turbine production similar to Europe during the 990s is unlikely.
Regarding the potential for increasing global integration of wind industry value chains, industry experts expressed the belief that some turbine components (noticeably relatively easier to transport bearings and gearboxes) will be more mobile and subject to industry consolidation and economies of scale in the future. As such, increased global sourcing of such less bulky components could be envisioned from Northeast Asia (China, Korea, and Japan), where forgings and cast iron supply facilities are abundant.
Similarly, several industry experts conveyed that some countries would be able to continue to benefit from existing strong competitive positions in wind sector related services, such as R&D services in Denmark and Germany and perhaps financial services in the United States. Within regional production hubs, countries with relatively low labor costs might have an advantage in the final assembly of the nacelle if they possess the necessary infrastructure and skilled labor. This seems to suggest a win-win situation with opportunities for different countries to develop comparative advantage in different activities along the wind value chain.
exIStInG bArrIerS to GlobAl InteGrAtIon In the WInd Sector
Both cross-border trade and FDI have driven the global integration of the wind industry, with FDI becoming increasingly important over time compared with other industries. In addition to commercial calculations, government policies are shaping the choice of firms between trade and FDI as globalization vehicles. This section analyzes the degree to which national investment, trade, and industrial policies impede market-based developments in the global wind sector and prevent firms from streamlining their value chains in the most efficient way across borders in their efforts to reduce costs.
tariffs
One potential barrier is tariffs, which increase the cost of trading and put an incentive on firms to relocate production to a less efficient location to avoid these costs ("tariff-hopping" The latter has been widely criticized for creating significant bottlenecks in the supply of wind turbines in Brazil, and the switch to a tariff-based trade barrier hence represents a change in the choice of protectionist policy tool by the Brazilian government.
local content requirements
A second widely discussed variable that is intervening in firms' decision-making are local content requirements (LCRs). Similar to tariffs, LCRs might cause "trade barrier-hopping FDI flows" to participate in a market if local content is mandated. 55 This type of provisions mandates the use of locally manufactured components or technology in installed wind turbines. Foreign (and domestic) companies wishing to sell their products in a given market are consequently compelled to relocate their own production facilities to the market in question, enter into a joint venture with local producers, or source their components locally.
These rules are often implemented at the subnational government level, adding considerable uncertainty to the enforcement process (which might vary from province to province) and forcing producers to locate in very specific parts of a particular market. Lewis and Wiser (2007) describes how 53 . Estimates in World Bank (2007) of a 2.6 percent increase in world trade from elimination of tariffs in wind power generation, based upon a larger group of commodities, thus seem optimistic.
54. While individual wind turbine components can also be imported separately and under different customs headings than HS 8502.3, and some countries have encouraged this practice to spur local assembly by lowering tariffs in other applicable categories to below the levels in HS 8502.3, it is reasonable to regard tariff levels in HS 8502.3 as the tariff ceiling for wind turbine components. This is so, as described in Wind (2008) , due to the provisions that qualify individual wind turbine components to be included in 8502.3 when these are presented for customs purposes together "as a set." If tariff levels therefore are relatively lower in 8502.3 than in individual component categories, producers will almost always have the option of qualifying for customs processing in 8502.3 for any included component. LCRs for wind turbines 56 will likely not make much difference for supply chain decisions, as China has already built up substantial domestic wind turbine production capacity, following the industry dynamics and cost structures favoring local supply described above. However, it will increase firms' flexibility in organizing their supply chains.
differing Industrial Standards and certification requirements
A third and less discussed barrier to global streamlining of value chains, no matter via FDI or trade, are different industrial standards and certification requirements. In capital-intensive industries like wind energy, where large upfront capital investments must be made and financed, the standard product life is 20 years, and the product made (electricity) is an integral part of any nation's key public infrastructure, standards and certification requirements are often crucial in conveying the required confidence and trust between manufacturers, operators, owners, financial institutions, and national authorities. Unless wind turbines used in particular wind park projects have specified industrial certifications, it will often be impossible for developers to secure project financing. An illustrative example of the impact of different national standards on wind turbine design is given in Vestas (2009) , where there is a 30-ton difference in the weight of the tower for the V-90 3MW turbine between the international "IEC IIA standard" and the German-only "DIBt II" standard.
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Such differences in national standards can undermine economies of scale and add greatly to the costs for producers of entering new markets. This is despite the fact that the WTO Technical Barriers to
Trade Agreement, of which most major wind turbine market countries are members, requires that technical regulations "are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to trade" (Article 2.2). 64 The issue of certification requirements is also especially important for the services sector that is emerging around cross-border wind energy value chains.
Globally operating firms that provide services like wind site assessments, financial due diligence or project development services often face very high entry barriers in the form of approval processes and requirements to cooperate with local firms and government agencies. 63. Deutsches Institut für Bautechnik, www.dibt.de.
64. The WTO TBT Preamble on the other hand provides significant freedom for members to implement standards by stating that "no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal, and plant life or health, of the environment, or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers appropriate." See www.wto.org.
65. Industry experts referred to complicated and time-consuming approval procedures in several European countries. A special case is China, where government-owned planning and design institutes are involved in the licensing process for foreign service providers but at the same time compete with them for business.
whether the wind industry benefits directly from taxpayer funds or through nominally nontax measures such as mandatory surcharge fees or purchase requirements for wind-produced power passed on to all electricity consumers. The key issue is that elected politicians mobilize the "state's coercive power" to channel societal resources towards a favored industry and for this, they expect something in return.
Hence wind industry investments share at least some characteristics with general "government procurement," an area of international trade that is only very gradually being liberalized and opened up to international competition. 66 Hard-to-quantify political quid-pro-quo expectations will work hand in hand with explicit LCRs to guarantee that local investments and job creation are secured. Or they might operate independently, as in the world's largest wind industry FDI destination market in the United States, which has no explicit LCRs 67 but where the political process makes it extremely politically advantageous to produce wind turbines locally.
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Concerns over favoritism for local producers have been raised in both the United States and China.
In the United States, the debate has centered on "Buy American" provisions in the stimulus package.
When financial incentives for wind energy are appropriated through emergency stimulus programs, political quid-pro-quo expectations are even higher than usual, because the long-term policy aim of promoting wind energy is directly mixed up with the short-term policy goals of immediate domestic job creation and economic growth. 69 In China, the main source of concern has been the exclusion of foreign 7. According to a Xinhua News Agency report (2009), the irony is that explicit favoritism of Chinese producers will clearly have added to local interest in entering the wind turbine market and subsequent concerns about overcapacity. This suggests that in the wind industry there is a clear disconnect in policy between the central government in Beijing, which increasingly on indirect support in the form of a price on carbon emissions, will be a first step towards abating political quid-pro-quo expectations in the wind industry.
Summing up
The impact these barriers have on firms' decisions is complex. They will interfere with firms' supply chain allocation decisions and thus put upward pressure on wind turbine prices in a given market. However, at least two of the three nontariff barriers-LCRs and political quid-pro-quo expectations-will likely work to promote inward FDI at the expense of cross-border trade, while divergent industry standards and certification requirements cause a general increase in costs, irrespective of the mode of international transaction. At the same time, the size of the domestic market matters. If the market is big enough and the industry has high trading costs as in wind energy, basic market dynamics in an open global economy would likely lead to eventual establishment of a local production capacity, even in the absence of LCRs or political quid-pro-quo expectations. As such, in large markets such as China, their effect is likely mostly to accelerate and cement an inward investment trend, rather than independently trigger new investments.
GlobAl InteGrAtIon And locAl Job creAtIon
As the wind industry benefits from significant direct and indirect government financial support, it is unavoidable that expectations of job creation play an often decisive role in investment and regulatory decision-making. 72 In this light, investment and trade policies that foster global integration may be interpreted as the equivalent of shipping green jobs overseas. However, our review of existing literature suggests that wind power creates more jobs than power generation from traditional fossil fuels, while our analysis of wind industry value chains shows that globalization will have only a relatively small impact on local job creation compared with other industries during the process of global integration.
Comparative studies on the job impact of various energy sources have shown that wind power on average generates more jobs than do fossil fuel-based power sources during manufacturing, construction, and installation, reflecting both the complexity of wind turbine sourcing and production described in table   5 and the relatively dispersed nature of wind power (many turbines versus a single power plant). At the same time, wind power generates fewer jobs during O&M/fuel processing phases than do other sources of energy. This should not be surprising though, as first of all wind power requires no fuel processing (and as a consequence faces no supply security concerns), and second the wind industry as discussed above is attempts to restrain new entries into the wind sector, and Chinese provincial governments, which steers project orders directly and exclusively to Chinese producers.
72. Similar to almost any potential multinational investor, wind turbine producers in the United States and elsewhere generally also benefit from various direct investment subsidies enacted by local governments to attract investment. See Mattera (2009, 3) .
characterized by rapid productivity improvements. Table 9 breaks down the job-generating potential of five different energy sources from a number of different studies into two categories (roughly replicating the two wind sector value chains described in table 5): jobs created during the "manufacturing, construction, and installation" phase and jobs created during the "O&M and fuel processing phase." 73 These estimates indicate that on average, wind is likely more employment intensive than fossil fuel-based power generation but generates less employment than, for instance, solar PV power production.
There are no reliable or accurate estimates for global employment levels in the wind energy sector. Table 0 gives an overview of existing estimates of national employment and employment distribution. A key question for policymakers is to what degree future additional global integration of the wind industry will affect local job creation in the sector. For them, the risks in committing taxpayers' money in support for the sector are evident, if ultimately many "green wind jobs" end up being offshored. Our analysis provides two key reasons for why these risks are lower than in other industries.
First, wind jobs will overwhelmingly follow wind power demand, as the wind industry is characterized by FDI-driven global integration and the emergence of new domestic producers in markets of sufficient size. This will ensure that global employment growth result in localized job creation in at least the big three regional production centers in the European Union, United States, and China. It will also mean that Europe will continue to lose some of its existing "export dependent jobs" to predominantly US and Chinese locations, while on the other hand the continent seems likely to benefit from most future job generation in the offshore wind sector.
Second, the characteristics of both supply chains described in table 5 make wind power relatively 73. See also Kammen (2007) , Kammen and Engel (2009), and UNEP et al. (2008) . Note that the data presented in table 9 are from Wei, Patadia, and Kammen (2009) , a meta-study, for which the authors gathered estimates from several previously published studies. The data might therefore not accurately reflect the current industry employment generation capacity, due to technology improvements.
immune to jobs offshoring also in the long term compared with both fossil fuel and other renewable energy sources (especially solar PV). While the first (turbine production) chain is characterized by the bulky and hard-to-transport nature of many manufactured components, the second (wind power production) chain is predominantly made up of logistics, construction, and other wind services tasks bound to the local area.
74
Precise forecasts of employment creation should be treated with care. First, many of the most optimistic forecasts rely on methodologies that include, in addition to direct and indirect (from inputoutput table analysis of supply chains) job creation, so-called induced job creation -that is, jobs resulting from the spending by people directly and indirectly supported by a green project, such as grocery store clerks, retail sales people, or child care providers (DoE 2008, appendix C) . These effects are real, especially in many rural areas with few other sources of economic activity, but calculating the real and additional independent net job creation arising in this way is fraught with uncertainty. Second, the same learning curves that are making wind power ever more efficient and cost-competitive are making it less labor intensive. As with almost all manufacturing processes, we expect a shift in wind turbine production towards more capital-intensive processes, particularly in regions with high labor costs such as the European Union and United States. Similarly, as turbine designs improve and become more reliable, O&M should become both easier and less labor intensive.
Nevertheless, all sources and future projections that we have reviewed agree that the wind sector is destined for considerable job growth in the coming decades as global installed wind capacity continues to expand briskly. Wind energy has several appealing characteristics for policymakers seeking to build support for renewable energy by making a case for job creation. First, particularly during a period of growth, wind energy is likely to remain more labor intensive than traditional energy technologies. Second, the range of jobs created is attractive, including both blue collar manufacturing and a wide array of skilled scientific, engineering, and service roles. Finally, experience to date powerfully suggests that the bulk of jobs created will be where the market is-in other words, effective long-term measures taken to promote wind energy deployment will largely create employment in the same country or region.
concludInG remArkS
The wind power sector is among the most important commercial industries for climate change mitigation and is rapidly growing. Much of this growth is driven by government support aimed at not only reducing emissions and energy imports but also nurturing a new industry that promises substantial localized job creation. In this paper we have taken a closer look at the value chains underlying this industry to better understand some of the drivers and barriers to realizing this potential.
74. Wind service tasks are both varied and typically require high skill levels. Examples include meteorologists, wind surveyors, and structural, mechanical, and electrical engineers. See UNEP et al. (2008, 39) .
The very rapid growth of the wind industry in recent years has been closely tied to direct government policy, taking the form of financial support measures and increased mandating of renewable power production or consumption requirement for utilities. The recent spike in commodity prices and associated cost increases in the wind power sector had only a negligible effect on industry global growth rates. The effects of the current financial crisis and global recession on future growth rates are also quite minor. Credible long-term government policy commitments to the wind power sector continue to trump cyclical swings in the broader economy.
The wind industry provides a clear example of how a "green Keynesian industrial policy" can work.
If government policy creates sufficient demand for wind energy, local supply of wind turbines and related services will emerge either from new local entrants or via FDI. The wind industry is led by those countries that have developed large policy-supported wind energy markets. In part this has in some countries been aided by explicit LCRs, which have meant that building capacity in these markets was required. But it is largely due to the nature of wind technology itself. Wind turbines and their most important components are large, bulky, and difficult to transport, making trading them relatively expensive. This has meant that FDI rather than traded goods have played the most important role in internationalizing the industry. Commodity costs and localized investments dominate the wind industry's value chains. Conversely, labor cost differentials and intellectual property are less important drivers of cost (see box 3). Intellectual property in particular is broadly and commercially available and as such is not a significant barrier to wind energy development. Job creation is significant and likely to remain concentrated in countries with significant domestic markets, though the labor intensity of the industry will decline as production becomes more efficient.
Our findings yield several policy implications:
. The wind industry is a successful globally integrating industry with considerable developingcountry participation. As such, it underlines the important gains possible for both developed and developing countries from a long-term vision of a global approach to a new energy economy. 35
Box 3 Intellectual property rights: A barrier to wind technology transfer and global integration?
A pertinent question in the current COP15 climate change negotiations concerns the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in wind energy and other renewable energy sectors. Do IPRs hinder the access of developing countries to wind power technology or act as a barrier to globalizing value chains-i.e., hindering developingcountry turbine manufacturers or component suppliers from entering the local or global markets? This working paper contains several relevant findings for the wind industry: The low share of intellectual property costs in wind turbines shows how the wind industry is very different than, for instance, the pharmaceutical industry in its reliance on IPR-driven revenues (Abbott 2009 ). In the relatively technologically mature wind industry, where the basic know-how is cheap and readily available from turbine producers, intellectual property cost clearly has relatively limited impact on the final price of a wind turbine or wind park projects. This is illustrated in box 2, which describes the IPRs involved in Chinese turbines. Here the Chinese turbine manufacturer A-Power purchased the IPRs for its 2.5MW turbine from the German company Fuhrländer for a total of less than $15 million, including the training of its Chinese employees in Germany. 1 Meanwhile, the total project value of just the one 240-turbine wind farm in Texas is $1.5 billion, so that just less than 1 percent of the cost of that project was made up of IPR-related cost.
Studies and recent wind turbine producer annual reports indicate that patenting in the wind industry has picked up in recent years. 2 At the same time, however, analysis in Pew (2009) indicates that wind remains "patent light" with relatively fewer patents when compared with other renewable energy sources.
3 This is quite surprising, as wind, when compared with other renewable energy sources, is a far more commercially deployed technology. Commercial interest would predict that turbine producers would move aggressively to protect the proprietary value of offered products also through the use of patents. However, the actual number of patents is by itself a poor indicator of the importance of IPRs in a given industry. A single patent for a crucial technology can be a far larger source of revenue for the holder (or potential block on technology diffusion) than dozens of patents for more peripheral technologies. Moreover, in the wind industry, despite some instances of patent-related lawsuits, 4 by and large the fundamental know-how necessary to produce wind turbines is not protected by wholly privately owned IPRs.
The limited role of intellectual property in wind is also clearly illustrated by the prominent positioning of wind producers from developing countries noted in figure 1 , several of which, like A-Power in China, started out by licensing technologies from European firms and subsequently quickly mastering and redeveloping these (see also Lewis 2007) . Technology blueprints and licenses for wind turbines are readily accessible on cheap commercial terms from independent engineering and design companies providing such services. 5 Correspondingly, IPRs make up no noteworthy bottleneck for technology diffusion of wind turbine technology throughout the world and while some of the concerns expressed in the UNFCCC negotiating text in this regard might be relevant for other technologies they seem unwarranted with respect to the wind industry.
2. With wind industry development led by cross-border investment, rather than trade issues, policymakers can encourage economies of scale and efficiency gains through three investment policy actions:
* Although provisions such as LCRs have been used to secure political backing for financial support measures for wind energy and drive local employment creation, our analysis suggests that such job creation would likely occur without these requirements, especially in countries with large domestic wind markets. Given the importance of international cooperation on clean energy policy, LCRs should be phased out as soon as possible.
* Policymakers could focus on the establishment of global wind industry product standards and/or mutually agreed product certification requirements for relevant key wind turbine components.
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Box 3 Intellectual property rights: A barrier to wind technology transfer and global integration? (continued)
Instead, as explained in Maskus (2000) , the historical evidence from other industries suggests that strong globally enforced IPRs in the wind industry would continue to be a key driver of the steep wind industry learning curve. With the fundamental wind know-how established, cheap, and widely available, wind industry learning curves will instead increasingly be driven by incremental technology improvements in, for instance, advanced rotor aero-design, light-weight materials, and control systems. With competition and the number of global market participants increasing, strong IPR protection will be required for companies to fund this type of R&D. It correspondingly seems to be in the interest of developing countries like India and China-already key participants in the global wind turbine market-to ensure that the IPR of their domestic turbine manufacturers is internationally respected and protected.
Current technology transfer barriers as they exist in the wind industry are less related to intellectual property ownership issues and more to recipient country capacity, cost of capital, and institutional deficiencies. Many of the existing barriers can be addressed by capacity building. Skilled people who understand the technologies are necessary to develop, install, maintain, and adapt wind power technologies to local circumstances. Capacity building is also crucial to enhancing enabling environments, by strengthening policymakers' ability to design and implement policies and measures that support and accelerate the diffusion process.
Wind technologies are readily available at reasonable commercial terms, when compared with the overall large project financing costs in the wind sector. Thus it seems evident that a focus from developing countries on accessing cheaper financing and lowering the domestic cost of capital would have a far larger impact on the diffusion of wind power in developing countries than the pursuit of compulsory intellectual property transfer.
at an affordable price; and less developed countries should be exempt from patent protection of climate-related technologies for adaptation and mitigation, as required for capacity building and development needs. See also Lee, Iliev, and Preston 0 * Global integration of the wind sector could be encouraged through the establishment of an international sectoral Green Power Government Procurement Protocol, initially among "like-minded" countries, requiring enhanced transparency, national treatment, and nondiscrimination among local and foreign wind turbine producers, when large wind project contracts are awarded. 75 3. Government support and enabling environments have been and will be crucial to the development of the wind industry. Policies that create stable long-term demand for wind energy are a better approach to create local jobs and make green energy cheaper than policies that aim at protecting domestic firms. A global climate change agreement can further support the diffusion of wind power in developing countries by providing support, both in terms of capacity building and financial support, to enable developing countries to put in place policy measures in favor of renewable energy, develop grid systems that can integrate wind power and lower the high cost of capital. Such an integrated approach is more helpful than the bare transfer of intellectual property rights to the developing world.
4. Trade barriers do not constitute a major obstacle to wind power deployment, but conversely provide little protection for domestic industries. Therefore, their removal would have little substantive impact. Governments that support wind power and want to increase the effectiveness in terms of installed capacity per taxpayer dollar spent, should however remove tariffs unilaterally to capture the related minor cost reductions. Furthermore, unilateral tariff removal in wind energy could be a powerful political goodwill gesture in currently deadlocked WTO trade negotiations. Coordinated unilateral action among "like-minded" countries could be the first step towards a global agreement for comprehensive free trade in all "green technologies" modeled on the 995 Information Technology Agreement.
5. A successful conclusion of a global climate change agreement in the context of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and an associated expansion of global carbon pricing mechanisms and other policy drivers are vital. This will level the carbon playing field between wind and fossil fuel-based energy and potentially render the current effective direct public financial support for the wind sector increasingly unnecessary. With sufficiently high carbon prices, continued policy support will instead be provided indirectly to the wind industry (and other renewable sources) in an equal manner across renewable and fossil fuel-based energy sources. The risk of political interference in wind industry investment decisions could hereby be abated.
75. The recent announcement of a US-China bilateral agreement, which will see China remove its LCRs on wind products, is a potential important first step. See "China and US move to defuse trade row," Financial Times, October 29, 2009. Note: Bulk raw materials consist overwhelmingly of steel but also include permanent magnets, aluminum, copper, glass-fiber reinforced plastic, and carbon fiber reinforced plastic.
Sources: DoE (00); authors' industry expert interviews, August/September 009. Note: The data are average annual employment numbers distributed over the lifespan of an installation and takes into consideration the very different factor capacities of renewable (low factor capacities) and fossil fuel (high factor capacities) energy sources.
Source: Wei, Patadia, and Kammen (009) . 
